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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy has evolved from its early roots in property rights
and capitalism' to its modem role grounded in individual freedom.2 The United
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Frostburg State University. B.A., 1987, Youngs-
town State University; M.A., 1990, University of Akron; Ph. D., 1998, Kent State University.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ohio Northern University. B.A., 1994, Ohio North-
ern University; M.A., 1997, Ph. D., 2000, University of Tennessee at Knoxville.
See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PROPERTY AND THE CONSTrrUTION (1977); BENJAMIN
1
Johnson and Alexander: The Rehnquist Court and the Devolution of the Right to Privacy
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to privacy exists in the con-
text of marital privacy,3 heterosexual relations,4 and abortion rights.5 However,
it has not extended the right to privacy to such areas as homosexual behavior 6 or
the right to die.7 The right to privacy remains a controversial issue among a
wide variety of legal scholars because it is not mentioned specifically in the
United States Constitution. Hence, conservative scholars who practice a strict,
or literal, reading of the Constitution have been troubled by the recognition of
such implied rights. Because a growing movement has developed on the Su-
preme Court to temper, or eliminate, the right to privacy, it is necessary to ex-
plore whether conservative justices have been successful in their attempt to re-
turn to a strict interpretation of the Constitution.
To determine whether the right to privacy has devolved, this article ana-
lyzes the history and development of the right to privacy as well as the relevant
case law that recognized the right of privacy in the 1960s and 1970s. Part II ex-
plores the history and development of the right to privacy beginning with its
early advocacy by future justice Louis D. Brandies through the abortion deci-
sions and the issue of homosexuality. Part I examines recent decisions by the
Rehnquist Court challenging the right to privacy to determine if personal pri-
vacy has devolved since its recognition in Griswold v. Connecticut8 in 1965 and
evolution through the Burger Court era of the 1970s and early 1980s. Part IV
discusses the voting behavior of justices on the Rehnquist Court in privacy cases
using an interagreement matrix and bloc voting analysis. Finally, Part V draws a
comparison between the Burger and Rehnquist courts and concludes that the
right to privacy has been significantly altered by the conservative agenda of the
Rehnquist Court.
Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEz FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT
(1942).
2 See generally Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
3 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing a right to privacy by declar-
ing a Connecticut law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives unconstitutional).
4 The federal courts have acknowledged a right to privacy for consensual heterosexual behav-
ior. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a Massachusetts law banning the
use of contraceptives by unmarried persons).
5 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a right to privacy regarding the abor-
tion procedure).
6 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (A majority of the justices on the Court
declared a Georgia sodomy law constitutional based largely upon states' rights.).
7 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990).
8 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[Vol. 105
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss3/6
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND PRIVACY
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Brandeis Brief
In the late nineteenth century, the right of privacy was recognized to
protect the property rights of business owners, but privacy was not applied to
individuals at this time. 9 From 1880-1937, the Supreme Court promoted a lais-
sez-faire environment where the privacy rights of large corporations were pro-
tected from government regulation.' 0 However, during this same time period,
legal scholars were debating the evolution of privacy as it related to the rights of
individuals." One such scholar was Louis D. Brandeis who, prior to his confir-
mation to the Supreme Court, co-authored a law review article with Samuel
Warren which posited that privacy should extend beyond property to include
human rights to be free from technological and psychological interference.
12
After his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 1907, Justice Brandeis
persisted in his arguments for a right to personal privacy. In particular, he au-
thored a famous dissent in the landmark case of Olmstead v. United States,
13
where he laid the foundation for the future recognition of the right to privacy as
it related to individuals. In Olmstead, the Court in a five to four decision upheld
the conviction of several defendants arrested under the National Prohibition Act
for the illegal sale of alcohol, even though the evidence used by the federal offi-
cers had been secured through the wiretapping of telephone conversations.14
Dissenting, Justice Brandeis wrote that the wiretapping violated the
right to privacy found in the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment. He argued that "[t]he makers of the Constitution conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone."'15 The Court's subsequent development of
the right to privacy has proved Brandeis' dissent to be prophetic.
B. Griswold, the Penumbra Theory, and the Ninth Amendment
Even though Brandeis blazed a new trail with his dissenting argument
for individual privacy, it was not until the landmark case of Griswold v. Con-
necticut16 that a majority of justices recognized the existence of a constitutional
9 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 1.
10 See generally ARTHUR S. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1968).
11 See Brandeis & Warren, supra note 2, at 193; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886) (recognizing protection for privacy interests under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
12 See Brandeis & Warren, supra note 2, at 193
13 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
14 See id. at 456-57.
15 See id. at 477 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
16 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court relied upon Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
2003]
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right to personal privacy. Griswold involved a Connecticut state law that banned
the sale and distribution of contraceptives as well as the distribution of informa-
tion relating to such products. 17 In a seven to two decision, the Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional because it infringed upon marital privacy.'
8
However, because the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of pri-
vacy, the majority in Griswold had to address where privacy existed implicitly
in the document. While a number of the justices issued opinions on the matter,19
Justice William 0. Douglas' majority opinion and Justice Arthur Goldberg's
concurring opinion have received the most attention.
Douglas' majority opinion stated that the right to privacy could be
found in the penumbras, or "shadows," of the Bill of Rights.20 He wrote that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by the ema-
nations from those guarantees that give them life and substance" and that these
"[v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy. 21 In contrast to Douglas' Bill of
Rights analysis, Goldberg emphasized the Ninth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, which states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 2 2 He
remarked: "My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted and that
it embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not mentioned ex-
plicitly in the Constitution is supported ... by the language and history of the
Ninth Amendment. 2 3 Hence, Douglas and Goldberg each found the right to
personal privacy in vague parts of the Constitution. The vagueness of the pe-
numbra theory and the Ninth Amendment analysis would compel the justices to
develop the contours of the right to privacy more specifically in future cases.
Writing in dissent, Justices Hugo Black and Potter Stewart took a liter-
alist approach by arguing that a right of privacy did not exist in the Constitution
24because it was not specifically written into the text. Each was harshly critical
of the flexible approaches used to discover a constitutional right to personal
(1923), where the Court struck down a state law that prohibited modem languages other than
English from being taught to grade school children. For other pre-Griswold privacy cases, see
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
17 381 U.S. at 486.
1s Id.
19 Justice Douglas authored the majority opinion, Justice Goldberg and Justice Harlan both
issued separate concurring opinions, and Justice Black and Justice Stewart each wrote dissenting
opinions.
20 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
21 Id. at 484. Douglas discussed such specific guarantees in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments as they related to privacy.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
23 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487.
24 See id. at 530 (Black, J., dissenting).
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privacy. 25 In the cases following Griswold, the Court was forced to articulate
explicitly where privacy existed in the Constitution and also the scope of its
protection for the individual in society.
C. Privacy and Abortion Rights
While the Court did not specify in Griswold exactly where privacy ex-
isted in the Constitution, a majority of justices in the early 1970s further devel-
oped the right to privacy by tying it to a specific provision, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Roe v. Wade,2 6 the Court extended the
right to privacy to include a woman's right to abortion when it struck down a
Texas statute prohibiting the controversial medical procedure. Justice Harry
Blackmun's majority opinion discussed a variety of amendments to the Consti-
tution that implied privacy, but eventually settled on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.28 The Due Process Clause was strategically selected
because of its focus on freedom and liberty as well as its ability to nationalize
the right of personal privacy to the governments of all fifty states .29
Having acknowledged that privacy was a fundamental right derived
from the Due Process Clause, federal and state governments would have to
show a compelling state interest and a means narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest in restricting this basic right.30 In Roe, the Court ruled that a woman's
25 See id. at 508-27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 528-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
26 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27 Roe v. Wade involved a woman, Norma McCorvey, who attempted to obtain an abortion in
Texas where abortions were prohibited by state law. Her name was changed to "Jane Roe" to
maintain her anonymity. At the time of the case, McCorvey was a single mother of one child and
she considered herself too poor to have a second child. Attorneys for McCorvey argued that the
Texas statute violated her privacy rights found in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. KAREN O'CONNOR & LARRY SABATO, AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 165 (2001); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 121.
28 Id. at 122. Blackmun focused upon the concept of personal "liberty" found within the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
29 See generally Raoul Berger, The Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981). The Fourteenth Amendment refers
specifically to the regulation of state power. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
30 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was originally designed to prohibit
certain state actions. Specifically, it was developed with the intent to limit the power of states
from endorsing the practice of slavery. For an example of how the Fourteenth Amendment has
been used to nationalize the Bill of Rights and other fundamental guarantees, such as a right to
privacy, see RICHARD CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (1981). In regard to a
right to privacy, Blackmun discussed the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, however,
these amendments listed in the Bill of Rights would have limited only the federal government (i.e.
"Congress shall make no law. .. ."), not state governments. Roe, 410 U.S. at 123.
2003]
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right to privacy was absolute in the first trimester of her pregnancy term. 31
Hence, there was no compelling state interest that could justify the infringement
of a woman's right of privacy in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 32 How-
ever, in Blackmun's majority opinion, he recognized that the health of the preg-
nant mother and the pre-natal health of the fetus were compelling state interests
in the second and third trimesters, respectively.33 Because of these compelling
state interests, states can regulate abortions between the twelfth and
twenty-fourth weeks and can also ban abortions in the final twelve weeks of
34pregnancy.
3
The two dissenters in Roe, Justices William Rehnquist and Byron
White, opposed the majority's decision to establish a fundamental right to abor-
tion using the right to privacy. Rehnquist and White concluded that the right to
privacy was unrelated to the abortion decision and argued that the Court should
have exercised judicial restraint by deferring the issue to state governments. In
his dissenting opinion, Rehnquist wrote:
The fact that a majority of the States reflecting ... the majority
sentiment in those states, have had restrictions on abortions for
at least a century is strong indication . . . that the asserted right
to abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental. 35
Rehnquist expressed concern that the majority in Roe had engaged in a
type of judicial activism that was comparable to legislating, not interpreting.36
Since it was unclear whether the plaintiff Roe was in her first trimester of preg-
nancy during the pendency of the lawsuit, Rehnquist argued that the majority's
proscription of state regulation of first trimester abortions was an impermissibly
broad holding under the "precise facts., 37 Rehnquist also maintained that state
restrictions related to abortion should be treated as social and economic legisla-
tion which traditionally invoked the rational basis test because the medical pro-
cedure of abortion "[was] not 'private' in the ordinary usage of the word. 38
31 410 U.S. at 163.
32 Blackmun stated that the decision to obtain an abortion was between the woman and her
attending physician. Id. at 164-65.
33 Id. At the twelfth week of pregnancy, a "compelling point" is reached where the state has a
compelling interest to regulate the abortion procedure for the purposes of maternal health.
34 Id. At the twenty fourth week of pregnancy, a "second compelling point" allows for states
to ban abortions at the point of viability, or whenever the fetus can survive on its own from the
mother. The compelling state interest, at this point, is the potentiality of human life.
35 Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 171-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 105
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Under the rational basis test,39 a law regulating abortions was more likely to be
upheld because it only needed to be rationally related to a valid state interest
instead of being narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. In
short, the rational basis test would have provided less protection for a woman's
right to abortion by giving the states more latitude to legislate.
D. Homosexuality and the Right to Privacy
Prior to 1986, the Supreme Court had been evasive and ambiguous
about addressing the right to privacy in the context of homosexual behavior.4 °
Finally, in Bowers v. Hardwick,41 the Burger Court granted certiorari to a case
involving the constitutionality of state laws making homosexual acts a criminal
offense. In Bowers, Michael Hardwick of Atlanta, Georgia was arrested for
having sexual relations with another adult male in his bedroom.42 Similar to
other states at this time, Georgia prohibited anal, or oral, sex with another per-
son under a sodomy law. 43 While Hardwick could have received a prison sen-
tence of twenty years for violation of the statute, the District Attorney for the
city of Atlanta decided not to pursue charges.44 After his arrest, Hardwick re-
ceived support from the American Civil Liberties Union, who challenged the
constitutionality of the statute in federal court by arguing that the sodomy law
39 For a summary of the rational basis test, see Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78-79 (1911).
40 See Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y for the City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (af-
firmed without opinion). In this case, the Court found that a Virginia sodomy law was constitu-
tional; however, the decision was a summary opinion because only three justices voted to hear
oral arguments. The Court simply allowed for the District Court decision upholding the law to
stand. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975). It was not deemed to be controlling precedent. See also Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City v.
Nat'l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (voting 4-4 to leave intact a lower court ruling that
declared an Oklahoma law unconstitutional because it provided for dismissal of teachers who
advocate homosexual relations).
41 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42 A police officer was serving an arrest warrant for Hardwick because he had failed to appear
in Court on a charge of drinking in public. A housemate of Hardwick's let the police officer into
the home and told him he could look in his room. The officer discovered Hardwick and his male
companion in bed together. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 394-95
(1990).
43 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1999) (first passed in 1816) (stating: "A person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another."); see also MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, at 362 (Peter
Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993). But see Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (hold-
ing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 unconstitutional under the Georgia Constitution).
44 IRONS, supra note 42, at 396-97.
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violated Hardwick's right to privacy.45 Hardwick's attorneys relied on precedent
establishing the right to privacy in such landmark rulings as Roe.4 6
For many observers, it seemed logical to extend the right of privacy to
homosexual behavior because the Court already had recognized a zone of pri-
vacy for married couples, women seeking abortions, and heterosexual rela-
tions.47 However, the Court ruled by a narrow five to four vote that the right of
privacy did not confer a right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, therefore,
the Georgia sodomy law was judged constitutional.48 In Justice Byron White's
majority opinion, he distinguished the privacy cases from Griswold to Roe.
Justice White wrote that "none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts
of sodomy . . . ."49 Furthermore, the majority concluded that "[n]o connection
between family, marriage, or procreation, on the one hand and homosexual ac-
tivity on the other has been demonstrated ....
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun began by quoting Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in response to the majority's reliance upon history in
the Bowers decision. Blackmun wrote:
Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "[ilt is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.",
5
'
Next, Blackmun criticized the majority for an "almost obsessive focus
on homosexual activity. .... "52 In reality, the sex or status of the person commit-
ting the crime was not stipulated by the sodomy law.53 According to Blackmun,
the majority distorted the issue by using homosexuality to avoid the question of
45 See THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES 802-03 (1997).
46 See IRONS, supra note 42, at 386.
47 See David R. Carlin, Jr., Leviathan at Large: The Court and the Right to Privacy,
COMMONWEALTH, Sept. 12, 1986, at 456; Mark F. Kohler, History, Homosexuals, and Homopho-
bia: The Judicial Intolerance of Bowers v. Hardwick, 19 CONN. L. REV. 129 (1986).
48 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
49 Id. at 190-91.
50 Id. at 191.
51 Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
52 Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53 Justice Blackmun wrote that "[t]he sex or status of the persons who engage in the [criminal]
act is irrelevant as a matter of [Georgia] law." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 105
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss3/6
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND PRIVACY
whether the sodomy law violated the right to privacy. 54 Blackmun argued that
the sodomy law clearly violated the right to privacy found in the Due Process
Clause and should have been declared unconstitutional.55
Finally, Blackmun discussed how each person defines him or herself
according to their sexuality. In regard to intimate sexual relationships, all per-
sons should have freedom of choice. Without this fundamental right, citizens
will lose the freedom and privacy to express themselves as individuals.56
Some legal scholars speculated that the Bowers decision was based
upon the majority's attitudes about the morality of homosexuality.57 The case
can also be criticized as a disregard for precedent.58 However, Justice White
relied upon both historical 59 and institutional60 grounds in ruling against Hard-
wick's claim of privacy for homosexual behavior.6' While it seemed inevitable
that the Court would stop expanding privacy into new areas because it is an im-
plicit right, one scholar, Norman Vieira, suggested that Bowers might signal the
beginning of the end for the right to privacy. Vieira argued that "Hardwick
opened the way for significant restrictions even on family-related claims, by
repudiating the basic reasoning of Roe v. Wade., 62 Vieira concluded that the
main target of the conservative justices in Bowers might not have been homo-
sexual behavior, but the right to privacy in general. 63 Vieira's argument is con-
vincing in light of Justice White's opinion in Bowers where he states that the
54 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57 It has been recognized that the prohibition against homosexual sodomy is an issue of moral-
ity based upon the idea that homosexuality is a sin against God and nature. See HENSLEY ET AL.,
supra 45, at 803.
58 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59 In his majority opinion, Justice White wrote about sodomy laws having ancient roots and
how all of the original thirteen colonies enacted sodomy laws. As recently as 1960, all fifty states
criminalized homosexual behavior. Id. at 192.
60 White discussed how the judiciary should exercise restraint when it is faced with issues not
grounded in the Constitution. The legitimacy and authority of the Court as an institution are
threatened when it establishes judge-made law with little or no roots in the Constitution. Id. at
194.
61 While White discussed historical and institutional reasons for the Court's ruling, the ab-
sence of case precedent to support his majority opinion was evident. See id.
62 See Norman Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1183
(1988). Vieira argues that the Hardwick decision undermines Roe v. Wade. He wrote: "The Court
in Roe had relied on historical and prudential arguments to invalidate state controls on abortion. In
Hardwick, the Court paid lip service to such historical arguments and ignored prudential ones." Id.
Vieira also suggests alternative ways for establishing a right to privacy, such as the Thirteenth
Amendment's ban on involuntary servitude. Id. at 1189-91.
63 Id. at 1186.
20031
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flexible interpretation of the Constitution establishing a right to privacy has
harmed the integrity of the Court as an institution.64 It remains unclear, however,
whether the real motivation behind the Bowers decision was the majority's atti-
tudes toward homosexuals or an attack on the legal reasoning that established
the right to privacy.
In the end, Bowers was an ominous sign for the supporters of the right
to privacy. Future cases dealing with privacy would be decided by a more con-
servative Court led by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and a number of ap-
pointments made by Republican Presidents Ronald W. Reagan and George H.
W. Bush.65 As the leadership and composition of the Court have changed in the
conservative direction during the Rehnquist Court era, it is noteworthy that three
justices who had supported the right to privacy have been replaced.66
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan nominated Associate Justice William
H. Rehnquist to become the next chief justice of the United States Supreme
67Court. Rehnquist was confirmed by the Senate, but not without controversy
regarding his conservative philosophy emphasizing majoritarianism and judicial
restraint. 68 Legal observers expected Rehnquist to lead the Court toward a con-
servative counterrevolution.69 As part of this revolution, many scholars and ac-
tivists predicted that the right to privacy would be modified considerably, or
even eliminated. 70 The following analysis investigates this prediction by divid-
ing the Rehnquist era privacy cases into two categories: those concerning abor-
tion and cases involving a claimed right to die.
64 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. Whenever the U. S. Supreme Court recognizes rights that are
not explicitly listed in the Constitution, scholars claim that the Court goes beyond the law and
becomes too political. This harms the image of the law as being above politics. See generally
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
65 President Ronald Reagan appointed Justice Sandra Day 0' Connor in 1981, Justice Antonin
Scalia in 1986, and Justice Anthony Kennedy in 1988. Reagan also promoted William Rehnquist
from Associate Justice to Chief Justice in 1986. President George H. W. Bush appointed Justice
David Souter in 1990 and Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45,
at 69-80.
66 Justice William Brennan (1956-1990) was replaced by Justice David Souter (1990-present),
Justice Thurgood Marshall (1967-1991) was followed by Clarence Thomas (1991-present), and
Justice Harry Blackmun (1970-1994) was replaced by Justice Stephen Breyer (1994-present). Id.
67 Id. at 63-64.
68 See generally SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
69 Judicial scholars often have referred to an upcoming conservative counterrevolution as a
reaction to the liberal revolution of the 1950s and 1960s wherein Chief Justice Earl Warren led the
Court toward judicial activism. See David M. O'Brien, The Supreme Court: From Warren to
Burger to Rehnquist, 20 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 12, 12-20 (1987).
70 See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 832-859.
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A. Abortion Rights
As of 2002, the Rehnquist Court has decided eight cases that centered
upon abortion and the right to privacy. This section divides these cases into
three categories: 1) direct challenges to Roe, 2) minors and abortion policy, and
3) federal funding and abortion.
1. Direct Challenges to Roe: Webster and Casey
The Rehnquist Court heard its first privacy case during the 1988-89
term. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,71 the Court addressed the
constitutionality of several abortion regulations. Missouri had enacted legisla-
tion that defined life as "begin[ning] at conception," banned the use of public
facilities or employees to perform abortions, prohibited public funding for abor-
tion counseling and, finally, required physicians to conduct viability tests before
performing an abortion. 2  Webster was a much anticipated decision because
legal scholars predicted that the regulations would be upheld and the Roe prece-
dent would be overturned.73
In a five to four vote, the Court upheld the viability tests74 and the ban
on public facilities and employees as constitutional,75 but chose not to rule on
the question of when life begins or the ban on public funding for abortion coun-
seling.76 In Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, he stated that the state's
declaration that life begins at conception was not a regulation on the abortion
procedure, but merely an expression of the value of life by the state.77 Likewise,
Rehnquist asserted that the ban on public funding did not adversely affect the
right to an abortion.78 In upholding the regulations related to the prohibition of
public facilities or employees being used for abortions, Rehnquist wrote that the
regulations did not create a government obstacle for a woman seeking an abor-
tion and that precedent "support[ed] the view that the State need not commit any
resources to facilitat[e] abortions ....
The real threat to Roe emerged with Rehnquist's discussion of viability
testing. The Missouri law required all women to be tested at the twentieth week
71 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
72 Id. at 501.
73 After Justice Kennedy was appointed in 1988, a majority of the court in favor of overturn-
ing Roe appeared to exist for the first time. See HENSLEY, ET AL., supra note 45, at 836.
74 Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20.
75 Id. at 507.
76 Id. at 506-07.
77 Id. at 505.
78 Id. at 507-10.
79 Id. at 511.
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of pregnancy to determine if the fetus could survive on its own.80 Rehnquist
maintained that because Roe only protected the fetus after the third trimester, or
beyond the twenty fourth week of pregnancy, that the trimester approach in Roe
would have to be abandoned. 8' Rehnquist argued that this would not overturn
Roe,82 although the dissent maintained that this significant change would have
83
essentially overturned Roe.
While Justice Sandra Day O'Connor voted with the plurality to uphold
the abortion regulations including viability testing, she disagreed with
Rehnquist's legal reasoning concerning viability testing.84 She refused to sign
on to that section of Rehnquist's opinion because she felt that his interpretation
of viability testing would have overturned Roe.85 With only four justices signing
on to Rehnquist's plurality opinion,86 it did not carry the weight of precedent 87
and therefore Roe and the trimester approach were not overturned.88
In dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed real concern for the liberty and
equality of women in arguing that all of the regulations should have been struck
down as unconstitutional.89 In particular, Blackmun considered the viability
testing to be dangerous and unnecessary because it did not promote maternal
and fetal health, a requirement of the trimester approach in judging the constitu-
tionality of abortion regulations during the second trimester. 90
Three years after Webster, the Rehnquist Court issued one of its most
important decisions to date concerning privacy and abortion in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.91 While many observers again
expected Roe to be overturned, the Court instead issued a fragmented and am-
biguous decision that left judicial scholars uncertain about the true meaning of
the ruling.92 Casey involved several provisions passed by the Pennsylvania
legislature that placed restrictions on abortion procedures.93 Specifically, the
80 Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 513 (1989).
81 See id. at 518-19.
82 Id. at 521.
83 Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 119-20 (1993) (discussing Blackmun's dissenting opinion).
94 Webster, 492 U.S. at 525 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
85 Id. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
86 The four justices forming the plurality were Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy.
87 It takes a majority of the justices on the Court, or five justices, to establish binding case
precedent. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 897 (defining majority opinion).
88 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89 See id. at 539-41 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90 See id. at 542-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
92 See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 845-47.
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islature that placed restrictions on abortion procedures. 93 Specifically, the Penn-
sylvania statute required informed consent from the pregnant woman, a manda-
tory twenty-four hour waiting period, parental consent for minors, spousal noti-
fication, and public reporting and disclosure requirements.
94
In a plurality opinion joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, David
Souter, and Anthony Kennedy, the trio expressed doubt about Roe but asserted
that its basic principles 95 must be affirmed to preserve judicial integrity and to
maintain respect for Court precedent.96 While Roe was not overturned, it was
altered considerably in the Court's opinion. First, all of the Pennsylvania statu-
tory provisions were upheld as constitutional, with the exception of spousal noti-
fication.97 By allowing these abortion restrictions to stand, the Court changed
course significantly in its application of Roe.98 The Court also decided to aban-
don the trimester approach in favor of an "undue burden" analysis. 99 This
analysis determined whether a substantial obstacle had been placed in the path
of a woman trying to secure an abortion prior to fetal viability. 1°° As such, "a
statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid
state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legiti-
mate ends."'10 ' As Justice O'Connor explained, "understood another way, we
answer the question, left open in previous opinions discussing the undue burden
formulation, whether a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal life
which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decisions before fetal viability
could be constitutional. The answer is no. 10 2 Casey perplexed many Court ob-
servers because, while it appeared to preserve Roe, it also returned considerable
power to the States who could more easily restrict and influence the abortion
procedure using the "undue burden" analysis.10 3 In the plurality opinion, the
three justices noted:
93 505 U.S. at 844.
94 Id.; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990).
95 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 ("The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is
the most central principle of Roe v. Wade.").
96 Id. at 845-46.
97 Id. at 900.
98 The Supreme Court previously struck down similar provisions based on Roe. See, e.g., City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
99 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873, 879.
100 Id. at 877.
101 Id.
102 Id. (internal citations omitted).
103 See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 858.
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[T]he State may enact rules and regulations designed to encour-
age [a woman] to know that there are philosophic and social ar-
guments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of
continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are proce-
dures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as
well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses
not to raise the child herself.'04
It was clear that abortion restrictions at the state level would no longer
be subject to the highest level of judicial scrutiny, unless deemed an undue bur-
den. This was evident in Casey, where only the spousal consent provision was
judged as an undue burden.10 5 Moreover, by abandoning the trimester approach
in favor of the point of viability, or when the fetus can survive outside of the
mother's womb, states could issue the most severe restrictions at viability. Un-
der the trimester approach, the point of viability had been set firmly at the
twenty-fourth week of pregnancy, but this was strongly criticized as time-bound
and unworkable in post-Roe rulings.' °6 Interestingly, this point of viability con-
tinues to be debated within state legislatures'0 7 and also has been susceptible to
change given advances in technology.
0 8
Technically, Casey was a five to four vote; however, only three justices,
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, formed the plurality. 109 Justices John Paul Ste-
vens and Harry Blackmun, the author of the majority opinion in Roe, wrote
separate opinions where both concurred in part and dissented in part." 0 While
Blackmun praised the plurality for reaffirming Roe,"' he would have struck
down all of the provisions as unconstitutional using the highest standard of strict
104 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
105 See id. at 900.
106 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452-54 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107 Thirty state legislatures passed laws banning partial-birth abortions using the viability ar-
gument; however, these laws were struck down as unconstitutional in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000).
108 See id. at 924. As technology evolves, it is likely that the point of viability will occur earlier
during the pregnancy term. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 452-53 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
109 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1992).
110 See id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
III Id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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scrutiny. 12 Blackmun also expressed concern that the Court was only one vote
away from overturning Roe."l
3
The four dissenting justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
White, and Thomas voted to overturn Roe and send the abortion issue back to
the states." 4 Rehnquist argued that abortion was not a fundamental right and
claimed that, while the plurality opinion recognized this point, their decision
would allow Roe to continue to exist only as an "illusion of reality."' 15
Rehnquist chastised the plurality for developing the "undue burden" standard
which created an "entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in consti-
tutional law .. . to decide the constitutionality of state laws regulating abor-
tion."1 6 He concluded by noting that "[n]either stare decisis nor 'legitimacy' are
truly served by such an effort."' 1 7 In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia argued
that states should be able to prohibit abortion because the Constitution is silent
on the issue and because the "longstanding traditions of American society" have
allowed for such laws. 1 8 Scalia emphasized that his views on abortion were
based solely on the law, not on his personal views. 119  While no direct chal-
lenge to Roe has been heard since the Casey ruling, 120 an example of the Court's
application of the "undue burden" standard was evident in the 1997 decision of
Mazurek v. Armstrong 121 wherein the Court upheld a Montana law that required
only licensed physicians to perform abortions.122 In a six to three decision, the
Court held that such restrictions did not constitute an "undue burden" on a
woman seeking an abortion. 123 In Mazurek, it was clear that the "undue burden"
standard would make it easier for the conservative justices to uphold restrictions
112 Id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113 See id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(joined by Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas).
115 Id. at 954 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
116 Id. at 966 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
117 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
118 Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
119 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
120 Since Casey, the Court has denied review of a number of cases dealing with potential chal-
lenges to the Roe precedent. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert
denied, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1993), cert denied,
510 U.S. 976 (1993); Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S.
972 (1993); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992);
Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied,
506 U.S. 1011 (1992).
121 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam).
122 Id. at 974-75.
123 Id. at 976.
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on the abortion procedure because if a restriction is deemed not to be an undue
burden then it only must pass the rational basis test.
124
The most recent decision involving an application of the "undue bur-
den" standard concerned the issue of partial-birth abortion. In Stenberg v.
Carhart,125 the Rehnquist Court voted five to four to strike down a Nebraska
law prohibiting partial-birth abortion, unless necessary to save the life of the
mother. 126 Stenberg constituted the only liberal, or pro-choice, ruling from the
Rehnquist Court in eleven privacy cases.
127
Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer struck down the law as
unconstitutional because it did not provide an exception for protecting the health
of the mother and placed an undue burden on women seeking abortions.
128
Breyer reaffirmed the precedent established in Roe and Casey "that the
Constitution offers basic protection to the woman's right to choose.' ' 29 In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the states had an
interest in protecting the unborn and applied the undue burden analysis to find
that the Nebraska law did not create a substantial obstacle for women seeking an
abortion. 30 Thomas argued that the state's interest in protecting life had been
decided in Casey.'31 Further, the Nebraska statute did not place a substantial
obstacle to obtaining an abortion because the Court failed to identify a real
barrier to a woman's ability to obtain an abortion and the Court failed to
demonstrate that the statute would affect a significant number of women.
1 32
2. Minors and Abortion Rights
In 1990, the Rehnquist Court handed down three privacy decisions in-
volving the parental notification of minors attempting to obtain abortions. In
124 Id.
125 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
126 See id. at 922.
127 A liberal vote is one which favors the individual claiming a civil rights or liberties violation
by the government. Hence, a vote in favor of privacy is considered a liberal vote. See generally
HAROLD SPAETH, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953-1997 TERMS, at 88
(1999), available at http://www.polisci.umn.edu/faculty/tjohnson/4309/cb9422.yr99.pdf;
HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 832.
128 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
129 Id. at 921. One of the problems with the Nebraska statute was that it did not draw a clear
distinction between the procedure of partial birth abortion and the procedure used for second
trimester abortions. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-326 (9), 28-328 (1-4) (Supp. 1999); Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 943-44.
130 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1006-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 981 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 83 (1992)).
132 See id. at 1013 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Hodgson v. Minnesota,133 the justices split five to four in striking down a Min-
nesota law requiring physicians to notify both parents before an abortion was
performed on a minor and requiring physicians to wait forty-eight hours after
the notification before proceeding with the abortion. Justice Stevens announced
the majority opinion and stated that the two parent notification rule would cause
difficulties for minors whose parents were separated or divorced.' 34 In addition,
it is possible that one parent may have deserted a minor.' 35 Stevens also noted
that the two parent notification rule increased the likelihood that minors might
be exposed to trauma or family violence. 36 According to the majority, the two
parent notification served no legitimate state interest, however, a one parent
notification rule would serve the best interest of the minor.
137
While the Court struck down the two parent notification rule, the jus-
tices voted to uphold a critical portion of the Minnesota law that provided a ju-
dicial bypass procedure. 38 This section of the law allowed for a minor to obtain
an abortion if she convinced a judge that an abortion without notifying her par-
ents was in her best interest. 3 9 In upholding this less restrictive portion of the
Minnesota law, the Rehnquist Court maintained its conservatism toward the
freedom of a minor to seek an abortion.
In a companion case to Hodgson, the Court voted six to three in Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health'4° to uphold an Ohio law involving a one
parent notification rule with a judicial bypass procedure that involved testimony
from a relative of the minor. The controversy focused upon whether the bypass
procedure met the constitutional requirements for such a procedure set forth in
Bellotti v. Baird.'4' A six justice majority concluded that the bypass procedure
met the requirements and did not place an undue burden upon minors attempting
133 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
134 Id. at 419.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 450.
138 Id. at 420,
139 Id. at 427.
140 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
141 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts parental consent
law with a judicial bypass procedure because the bypass procedure did not protect the privacy
rights of the minor. Id. at 651. Justice Lewis Powell set forth three requirements for a legitimate
judicial bypass procedure: 1) the minor must exhibit maturity in the abortion decision or that the
abortion decision is in her best interests; 2) the minor's anonymity must be assured; and 3) the
appeals process must be provided with expedition. Id. at 643-44.; see also Planned Parenthood
Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
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to secure abortions. 142 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion stated that, while the
judicial bypass procedure has never been required in regard to parental notifica-
tion laws, the Ohio law provided for a bypass procedure that met the standard
for cases involving parental consent laws which is more intrusive to the minor
than parental notification.
143
Dissenting, Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan argued that the
Ohio law did not meet the Court's standards for a bypass procedure and also
obstructed minors who sought to exercise their right to an abortion. Blackmun
commented that "the statute deliberately places state created obstacles... in the
legislative hope that [the minor] will stumble, perhaps fall, and at least ensuring
that she 'conquer a multi-faceted obstacle course' before she is able to exercise
her constitutional right to an abortion."' 44
Blackmun noted that requiring a minor to seek approval from a judge,
after the filing of court documents and testimony from a relative that the minor
could face abuse, might have drastic consequences. A minor might be trauma-
tized if she is forced to reveal that she has been sexually abused by a parent in
order to prove to a judge that she has clear and convincing evidence required for
a judicial bypass. 145
In 1997, the Rehnquist Court decided Lambert v. Wicklund 146 and reaf-
firmed the Hodgson and Akron Center holdings regarding parental notification
and the judicial bypass procedure. In a six to three vote, the Court held that
Montana's 1995 Parental Notice of Abortion Act was constitutional and pro-
vided sufficient protection for a minor's right to abortion. 47 The statute con-
tained a judicial bypass procedure, similar to those discussed in the Hodgson
and Akron Center cases, wherein the courts could waive the notice requirement
if it was not in the best interest of the minor to notify a parent.
48
3. Federal Funding and Abortion Rights
Another constitutional issue concerning abortion involves the question
of federal funding for the procedure. In 1980, the Court ruled that it was consti-
142 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 503.
143 Id. at 510. In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the
Court ruled that to prevent another person from having complete power over a minor's decision to
have an abortion, a bypass procedure must be provided by the State if it chooses to require paren-
tal consent. See also Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622.
144 Akron Ctr.for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 527 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
147 Id. at 298-99.
148 See id. at 293-94.
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tutional for Congress to ban the use of federal funds for abortions.1 49 The
Rehnquist Court returned to the issue of federal funds and abortion policy in
Rust v. Sullivan.150 At issue was the Public Health Service Act of 1970 which
specified that federal funds appropriated under Title X for family-planning ser-
vices were not to be used in programs where abortion was a method of family
planning.151 Early on, Title X was interpreted by officials at the Health and Hu-
man Services Department within the Reagan administration so that clinics could
not provide abortions, but could provide abortion counseling.' 52 In 1988, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services within the Reagan administration im-
plemented new regulations to prohibit any counseling or advocating of abortion
services at family planning agencies.153 Hence, clinics receiving federal monies
could not even discuss abortion with pregnant women. 54 Planned Parenthood
challenged the "gag rule" as a violation of freedom of speech as well as a viola-
tion of abortion and privacy rights established in Roe.
The Rehnquist Court handed down a controversial five to four ruling
with Justice Souter, in his first term, casting the deciding vote to uphold the gag
order and the Reagan administration's interpretation of Title X.155 In his major-
ity opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused upon the ambiguous language of
Title X as well as the Court's deference to administrative agencies as a basis for
upholding the "gag rule.' 56 The broad language used by Congress within Title
X allowed for a flexible interpretation by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. 57 Because Title X does not define "method of family planning" or
specify what types of counseling services are appropriate for federal funding,
Rehnquist stated that the Court was unable to find the new regulations to be
149 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (holding that the congressional ban on federal
funding for abortions did not violate the equal protection rights of poor women who could not
afford an abortion).
150 500 U.S. 173 (1991). The large majority of Supreme Court cases involving abortion regula-
tions concern state laws. In fact, the Court has ruled on only two cases involving federal law in the
area of abortion: Harris and Rust. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 844.
151 Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.




155 Justice David Souter replaced Justice William Brennan, a generally more liberal justice,
who most likely would have voted to strike down the gag rule in Rust. Hence, the appointment of
Souter to replace Brennan immediately had a significant impact on abortion policy. For a discus-
sion of Souter's impact during his first term on the Court, see Christopher E. Smith and Scott P.
Johnson, David Souter's First Term on the Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75
JUDICATURE 238 (1992).
156 Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
157 Id. at 184.
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impermissible without infringing upon the jurisdiction of a federal agency.158
Rehnquist wrote:
The Secretary's construction of Title X may not be disturbed as
an abuse of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of
the plain language of the statute and does not otherwise conflict
with Congress' expressed intent. In determining whether a con-
struction is permissible, "[t]he court need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it could permissibly have
adopted.., or even the reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."
Rather, substantial deference is accorded to the interpretation of
the authorizing statute by the agency authorized with adminis-
tering it. 159
In regard to arguments that the application of Title X violated freedom
of speech and a woman's right to abortion, Rehnquist noted that federal pro-
grams consistently have placed conditions upon programs that received federal
monies without violating free speech. 6° While acknowledging that a woman's
decision concerning an abortion might be made easier by information from a
family-planning clinic, he concluded that "the Constitution does not require that
the Government distort the scope" of the program to offer information to preg-
nant women considering an abortion.'
6 1
Justice Blackmun argued in his dissenting opinion that the "gag rule"
violated both freedom of speech and the right to abortion. 62 According to
Blackmun, the rule was an unconstitutional content-based and viewpoint-based
restriction that "manipulat[ed] . . . the doctor/patient dialogue.",63 Blackmun
also stated that the gag rule created a significant obstacle for poor women be-
cause the family planning clinics provided their only information about abor-
tion.' 64
158 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991).
159 Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984)).
160 Id. at 198.
161 Id. at 203.
162 Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. Right to Die Cases
The Rehnquist Court has also ruled upon privacy cases not involving
the issue of abortion. Since 1990, the Rehnquist Court has decided three cases
involving privacy and the right to die. Within the right to die controversy, the
Court has recognized a distinction, which carries constitutional significance,
between withholding medical treatment and actively assisting the suicide of a
patient. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 65 the Court
handed down a five to four decision stating that "clear and convincing" evidence
of a living will must be presented before a patient could be removed from life
support systems. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
held that states have the right to protect incompetent patients from the errant
decisions of others who might not represent their best interests. Rehnquist
wrote:
Not all incompetent patients will have loved ones available to
serve as surrogate decisionmakers. And even where family
members are present, "[t]here will be of course, some unfortu-
nate situations in which family members will not act to protect a
patient." A State is entitled to guard against potential abuses in
such situations.
166
Although the majority did not base its decision on the right to privacy, it
did acknowledge that, based upon :individual liberty interests in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, competent adults have the right to make
medical decisions about themselves that might result in their own death.
167
Hence, a constitutional right to die was given limited recognition by the major-
ity, but not within the context of the right to privacy.' 68 Even as the Court rec-
ognized a constitutional right to reject medical treatment, states continued to
retain considerable power in preserving the life of incompetent patients. 1
69
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan asserted that Missouri's re-
quirement of a living will or clear and convincing evidence of the patient's will
to withdraw medical treatment to end a life was too demanding. °70 Aside from a
living will, Brennan suggested that statements made to close friends and rela-
tives should be sufficient to determine if an incompetent patient wishes to be
165 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
166 Id. at 281 (quotation omitted).
167 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261. The Court believes that this issue is more properly analyzed in
terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 853.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 281.
170 Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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removed from life support. 17 1 In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens contended
that states should seek to determine the best interest of the patient and abandon
the clear and convincing evidence standard per se. 172 Stevens argued that the
best interest of the patient should be determined by the particular facts of each
case. 173
The Court addressed the issue of euthanasia in 1997, where the justices
unanimously rejected the practice of physician-assisted suicide as falling under a
right to privacy in two companion cases with opinions both written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. First, in Washington v. Glucksberg,174 the Court held that a
Washington statute making assisted suicide a felony did not violate the "liberty
interest" found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, Chief Justice Rehnquist
recognized the legal, historical, and practical condemnation of assisted suicide
in the political tradition of the United States and rejected the claim that indi-
viduals have a clear "liberty" interest regarding the mastery of their fate.
175
Specifically, he noted that the Court usually will support Due Process claims
that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," but assisted sui-
cide is not included within the history and tradition of the American experi-
ence. 1
76
In declaring Washington's ban of assisted suicide constitutional,
Rehnquist rationally connected the law to a legitimate government interest - an
"unqualified interest in the preservation of human life ... Moreover, the
fact that almost every state has recognized suicide as a crime demonstrates the
commitment of the states to the preservation of human life. 78
171 Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
175 Id. at 706.
176 Id. at 721 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
177 Id. at 728 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)).
178 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.100, 18.12.080(a), (f) (2002);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-3210 (Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-13-905(a), (f), 20-17-210(a),
(g) (1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 20-13-905 (West 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4723
(West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-504(4), 15-18-112(1), 15-18.5-101(3), 15-18.6-
108 (1987 & Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-575 (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
2512 (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2430, 21-2212 (1995 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ch.
765.309(1), (2) (Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-11(b), 31-36-2(b) (1996); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 327D-13 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-152 (Supp. 1996); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 35/9(t),
40/5, 40/50, 45/2-1 (1992); IND. CODE §§ 16-36-1-13, 16-36-4-19, 30-5-5-17 (1994 & Supp.
1997); IOWA CODE §§144A.11.1-144A.116, 144B.12.2 (1989 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§65-28,109 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.638 (Banks-Baldwin Supp.1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 1299.58.10(A), (B) (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-813(b), (c) (West
1996); MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-61 1(c) (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 12
(Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.496(20) (1995); MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.14, 145C.14
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In the companion case of Vacco v. Quill,179 the Court also unanimously
agreed that New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide was constitutional and
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rehnquist's unanimous opinion for the Court refused to acknowledge that ter-
minally ill patients who wished to participate in physician-assisted suicide were
being denied their equal rights because they were treated differently than pa-
tients who simply were allowed to die by refusing medical treatment, such as
life support systems. 180 In denying the equal protection claim, the Court drew a
rational distinction between the refusal of medical treatment and physician-
assisted suicide because letting a patient die and forcing a patient to die were
deemed fundamentally different.' 8'
Rehnquist relied heavily upon the intent behind each act because, while
each may result in death, the distinction between causation and intent must be
established. 182 He stated that a person refusing medical treatment dies from an
underlying pathological disease, however, physician-assisted suicide causes a
person to die from the medication administered by the physician. 83 Rehnquist
cited the overwhelming majority of state legislatures that recognized this dis-
tinction. 184 As with the Cruzan decision earlier, Vacco and Glucksberg placed
bright-line limits on the right to die and encouraged states to rely upon their
legislatures and the democratic process in making such difficult decisions about
life and death.
(Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-117(2), 41-41-119(1) (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
459.015.3, 459.055(5) (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-205(1), (7), 50-10-104(1), (6) (1995);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-412(1), (7), 30-3401(3) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. 449.670(2) (1996); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:10, 137-H:13, 137-J:1 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-54(d), (e),
26:2H-77 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13(B)(1), (C) (Supp. 1995); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§2989(3) (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320(b), 90-321(f) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-06.4-01, 23-06.5-01 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(A), (D) (Supp. 1996); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3101.2(C), 3101.12(A), (G) (1996); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5402 (Supp. 1996);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-9(a), (f), 23-4.11.10(a), (f) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-130, 44-
78-50(A), (C), 62-5-504(0) (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12D-14, 34-12D-20 (1994);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-110(a), 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 672.017, 672.020, 672.021 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1116, 75-2-1118 (1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5260 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-
10, 16-30A-16(a), 16-30B-2(b), 16-30C-14 (1995); Wis. STAT. §§ 154.11(1), (6), 154.25(7),
155.70(7) (Supp. 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-5-211, 35-22-109, 35-22-208 (1994 & Supp.
1996).
179 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
180 See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, SUPREME COURT WATCH 1997, at 117 (1998).
181 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 807 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278).
182 Id. at 801.
183 Id.
194 Id. at 804.
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The following sections will explore the voting behavior of the justices
of the Rehnquist Court in the privacy cases discussed above. The analysis below
attempts to explain more fully the attitudes of the Rehnquist Court justices to-
ward the right to privacy.
IV. THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES IN PRIVACY CASES
(1986-2000)
This part provides an empirical investigation of the voting behavior of
individual justices in privacy cases185 during the Rehnquist Court era. Descrip-
tive statistics are employed to highlight the liberal and conservative voting re-
cord of the individual justices. In addition, an interagreement matrix and bloc
voting analysis show which justices voted together most often in privacy cases.
Finally, a comparison is drawn between the Rehnquist and Burger Courts to
examine whether significant change has occurred in the area of privacy since
Rehnquist became Chief Justice.
A. Ideological Trends
Table 1 (see Appendix) illustrates the percentage of votes cast in the lib-
eral 186 and conservative 187 direction by individual justices in privacy cases.188 As
depicted in Table 1, Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry
Blackmun voted 100% in the liberal direction, demonstrating strong support for
the right to privacy. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, these three
justices comprised the liberal wing on a conservative Court packed with justices
appointed by Republican Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Ronald W. Reagan, and
George H. W. Bush. 189
With the departure of Brennan in 1990, Marshall in 1991, and Black-
mun in 1994, Justice John Paul Stevens apparently sat alone as the only liberal
member of the Court, at least in terms of privacy rights. Stevens has partici-
pated in all of the privacy cases during the Rehnquist Court era, voting 73 per-
185 For the purposes of this study, a privacy case is defined as any case that directly involves
the right to privacy as implied by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Harry Blackmun initially recognized the right to privacy in the Due Process Clause in his majority
.opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186 A liberal vote is one which favors the individual claiming a civil rights or liberties violation
by the government. Hence, a vote in favor of privacy is considered a liberal vote. See HENSLEY ET
AL., supra note 45, at 56.
187 A conservative vote favors the government infringing upon the rights of individuals. There-
fore, a vote against privacy is defined as conservative for the purposes of this study. Id. at 56.
188 It should be understood that the terms liberal and conservative are ambiguous concepts that
contain more than one dimension. See id. at 863-64.
189 President Richard Nixon appointed William Hubbs Rehnquist as Associate Justice in 1972.
For Reagan and Bush appointees, see id. at 877.
[Vol. 105
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss3/6
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND PRIVACY
cent in the liberal direction. Interestingly, Stevens has regained allies with recent
appointments made by President William Jefferson Clinton, namely Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.' 90 In addition, Justice David Souter,
appointed by President George H.W. Bush in 1990, has voted often with Ste-
vens and has surprised many conservatives with his moderate to liberal voting
record.191
As evidenced by the data in Table 1, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer sup-
ported privacy in three of the five cases in which they participated for a 60%
voting record in the liberal direction. While Souter acknowledged the right to
privacy during his Senate confirmation hearings and aligned often with the lib-
eral bloc on other issues, 92 he has provided less support for the liberal side in
privacy cases. Table 1 shows that Souter voted 71 percent in the conservative
direction with five of seven votes cast against privacy rights. It is worth noting,
however, that Souter did side with the liberal bloc in Stenberg 93 and also cast a
critical vote in Casey that prevented the Roe precedent from being overturned.
194
Hence, while the right to privacy did lose support with the departure of three
liberal justices in the early 1990s, the appointments of Ginsburg and Breyer by
President Clinton have provided renewed support for privacy and one Republi-
can appointment, Souter, holds some promise for the liberal side.' 95
The justices who have voted consistently against the right to privacy are
led by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Tho-
mas, and Byron White, who retired in 1993. Each of these four justices voted
100% conservative in privacy cases. Justice Anthony Kennedy, President
Reagan's last appointment in 1987, has also voted conservative in 91 percent of
190 For a discussion of Justice Ginsburg's influence on the Court, see Joan Biskupic, Nominee's
Philosophy Seen Strengthening the Center, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at Al. For a discussion
of Justice Breyer's influence, see Linda Greenhouse, Portrait of a Pragmatist, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 1994, at AI-A10.
191 During Justice Souter's first term on the Court (1990-1991), he voted with Justice Stevens
in 49% of cases involving civil liberties and civil rights. However, since his first term, Souter has
aligned with Stevens in approximately 75% of cases from 1991-2000. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra
note 45, at 86-89 and Supp. 2002 at 19-24. From 1990-2000, Justice David Souter's overall vot-
ing record in civil rights and liberties cases is 61% in the liberal direction. His voting record in the
last ten years suggests an increasing trend toward liberalism.
192 See Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson. Newcomer on the High Court: Justice Souter
and the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 37 S.D. L. REV. 21, 23 (1992).
193 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a Nebraska law prohibiting
partial-birth abortions unless necessary to save the life of the mother).
194 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
195 Because Souter has exhibited a moderate to liberal voting record overall and has voted with
the liberal bloc in two landmark cases involving privacy, it is conceivable that Souter will consis-
tently support the right to privacy as opportunities arise in future cases. In addition, Table 2 illus-
trates that Souter's agreement with Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer surpasses the Court mean of
52.22. See also generally William S. Jordan, Justice David Souter and Statutory Interpretation, 23
U. TOL. L. REV. 491 (1992).
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privacy cases. Justices David Souter and Sandra Day O'Connor complete the
list of conservative justices voting 71 and 63 percent respectively against pri-
vacy interests.
With six current justices voting consistently against the right to privacy,
it is possible that the Court is in the midst of a conservative counterrevoution.
Table 1 reveals the conservatism of the Rehnquist Court with a distribution of
63% conservative and 36% liberal votes cast in privacy cases. This suggests a
significant lack of support among the Rehnquist Court justices for the right to
privacy with approximately two of every three votes cast against the right to
privacy.
B. Interagreement and Bloc Voting Analysis
Table 2 provides an interagreement matrix of all justices who partici-
pated in privacy cases during the Rehnquist Court era. This matrix provides
percentages showing how frequently each justice voted with other justices. 197
Table 2 also offers a view of the voting blocs for the eleven privacy cases. A
bloc voting analysis shows the degree to which each individual justice agreed
with his or her colleagues on the Court. According to the established criterion,
98
a number of voting blocs can be identified on the Rehnquist Court in privacy
cases.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun constituted a liberal bloc as
they consistently voted together 100% of the time in four cases during the late
1980s and early 1990s. A "new" liberal bloc was formed with the departure of
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. In this "new block," Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer voted 100% of the time with Justice Stevens in five cases. Justice Souter
completes the "new" liberal bloc of four justices measuring an interagreement
index of 79.50, slightly above the criterion for establishing a voting bloc. It
196 A conservative counterrevolution is the overturning of liberal precedent from the Warren
court era of the 1950s and 1960s. Many legal scholars have predicted this revolution because of
the negative reaction from the public to many of the Warren court decisions such as the elimina-
tion of school prayer, desegregation, and expansion of criminal defendants' rights, etc., and be-
cause Republican presidents have dominated the appointment of justices to the Supreme Court
since the early 1970s. See, e.g., HENSLEY, ET AL., supra note 45, at 3-7.
197 An interagreement matrix yields a score for each pair of justices in all pertinent cases. This
score is determined by taking the number of cases in which the justices voted together, both lib-
eral, or both conservative, and dividing by the total number of cases in which they participated.
See WALTER MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 160 (1972).
198 Voting blocs are distinguished by using the "Sprague criterion." See JOHN SPRAGUE,
VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1968). John Sprague's formula estab-
lishes a consistency measure that justices must achieve to be regarded as a bloc. Therefore, in
Tables 3 and 4, the rate must be larger than a set amount: subtract the average of all interagree-
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should be noted that the "new" liberal bloc decreased considerably in strength
with the addition of Souter.
The conservative blocs in privacy cases are considerably larger than the
liberal blocs. Table 2 shows an "old" conservative bloc consisting of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas who voted
together approximately 95 percent of the time between 1986 and 1993. A "new"
conservative bloc composed of Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Souter
has emerged recently with an interagreement score of 86 percent. When this
group of five conservatives increased in size to six with the addition of Justice
O'Connor, the interagreement index score failed to qualify as a voting bloc
based upon the Sprague criterion.'
99
The results of this bloc voting analysis depict a Supreme Court that is
less supportive of privacy as it enters the twenty-first century. In the battle over
privacy rights, the conservatives have established a solid five-justice majority.
While the liberal bloc matches the conservative bloc in terms of voting strength,
it is smaller in size comprising only three justices. When the conservative and
liberal blocs increase in size beyond these numbers, the strength of the voting
blocs is reduced substantially as evidenced by the percentages listed in Table 2.
It is apparent that Justices Souter and O'Connor, as well as future ap-
pointments to the Court, will be the key players in the battle over privacy rights.
Souter and O'Connor clearly have become the swing votes in privacy cases.
Based upon the bloc voting analysis, Souter established himself as the only
member on the Rehnquist Court to align with both the conservative and liberal
blocs, while O'Connor was the only member not to align with any ideological
bloc. Hence, Souter and O'Connor hold the power to increase, or decrease, the
size of the ideological blocs in any given case. While Souter and O'Connor have
voted more often against privacy, each has demonstrated a willingness to sup-
port privacy interests at critical junctures. In particular, Souter and O'Connor
both played critical roles in reaffirming the Roe precedent in Casey and both
voted with the liberal bloc in Stenberg. Souter's moderate to liberal voting re-
cord overall and O'Connor's status as the first woman on the Court might pro-
vide some insight into their future behavior. It would seem unlikely that the de-
ciding vote to overturn Roe, and eliminate certain privacy rights for women,
would come from Souter, who has steadily become more liberal since his ap-
pointment to the Court in 1990,200 or O'Connor, who appears cognizant that her
vote is crucial to women's rights.2°'
199 See supra note 198.
200 See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 84 and Supp. 2002 at 17.
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C. A Comparative Perspective of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in
Privacy Cases
Table 3 provides a comparison of right to privacy cases during the Bur-
ger era of 1969-1985, and Rehnquist Court era of 1986 to the present, and offers
some evidence of a serious decline in support for privacy. During the tenure of
Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court split about evenly between conservative
and liberal decisions in privacy cases.20 2 However, a dramatic shift has occurred
under the leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist wherein ten of eleven
rulings have been decided in the conservative direction.20 3 A chi square test
was performed and illustrated that the difference in privacy rulings between the
Court eras is highly unlikely by chance. 20 5 Hence, the dramatic shift in the con-
servative rulings in privacy cases is most likely attributable to a change in the
leadership and composition of the Court.
It also is interesting to note that the Rehnquist Court has decided about
one-half the number of privacy cases as the Burger Court in approximately the
same amount of time. The fact that the Rehnquist Court has decided signifi-
202 The twenty-one cases judged to directly involve privacy during the Burger Court era are as
follows: Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Thomburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Williams v. Zbaraz,
448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (Baird H); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Carey v. Population Services, Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132 (1976) (Baird 1); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at
812-32; see also DAVID O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES 1199-1203 (1995).
203 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997);
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Web-
ster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
204 The chi-square test is designed to evaluate whether the difference between the observed
frequencies and expected frequencies establishes a statistically significant relationship. It is a non-
parametric test that does not assume a normal distribution and does not require interval level data.
This test is contrary to a parametric test of significance which assumes knowledge of the parame-
ters in the population using the normal distribution and interval level data. See CHAVA FRANKFORT
NACHMIAS & DAVID NACHMIAS, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 444-53 (2000).
205 A chi-square test of significance was conducted and illustrated a statistically significant
relationship between the Rehnquist Court and a shift in the conservative direction in the area of
privacy rights. The data revealed that this relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level
indicating a 95% confidence level that the Rehnquist Court era and the dramatic shift toward
conservatism in privacy cases are not independent of each other.
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cantly fewer cases is consistent with a minimalist approach 20 6 toward decision
making whereby the Court allows the democratic process to reign, particularly
when it "is dealing with an issue of high complexity about which many people
feel deeply and on which the nation is in flux." 207 The issues associated with the
right to privacy, such as abortion, homosexuality, and the right to die, fit per-
fectly within this minimalist approach because the complexity of each issue has
divided the American people. Consistent with the minimalist approach, the
Rehnquist Court has produced opinions with a very narrow scope in the area of
privacy. 208 This contrasts sharply with the broad, sweeping opinions handed




In the absolute sense, the right to privacy has not been eliminated during
the Rehnquist Court years. In theory, the right to privacy stands as a fundamen-
tal right based upon Court precedent established in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Roe. In practice, however, a conservative movement has significantly narrowed
the scope of privacy. In terms of abortion policy, while Roe has not been over-
turned, the Court has made it easier for states to place obstacles in the path of
women seeking abortions, particularly the young and the poor.210 The trimester
approach developed by Justice Blackmun in Roe has been abandoned in favor of
judging abortion restrictions according to the ambiguous "undue burden" analy-
sis. Given that the Rehnquist Court has adopted a minimalist approach,2 11 it is
206 A minimalist approach is consistent with the Court deferring to the elected branches of
government such as Congress, the President, and state legislatures as well as exercising judicial
restraint by deferring to state courts. See HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 45, at 65.
207 Cass Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 6, 8 (1996).
208 See supra Part III.
209 See supra Part II.B.-D.
210 The Court has made it more difficult for young women to obtain abortions because of the
strict regulations and parental notification laws. Poor women are also severely burdened by the
strict regulations. For example, the twenty-four hour notice regulations forces women to take
significant time away from the workplace when they cannot afford to take time off their jobs and
travel across a state where abortion services are provided. In Mississippi, it is estimated the num-
ber of abortions declined forty percent because of this required waiting period. In Barners v.
Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that this waiting pe-
riod was an "undue burden." Additionally, women from higher levels of the socio-economic
spectrum retain more options because they can afford to travel outside their home state or even to
another country to receive abortion services with fewer restrictions. See SMITH, supra note 83, at
122.
211 It is widely recognized that the Rehnquist Court has adopted a minimalist approach because
they are accepting and deciding significantly fewer cases every term in relation to previous
Courts. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, SUPREME COURT WATCH 11-15 (1997). The Rehnquist Court has
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highly unlikely that restrictive abortion laws passed by conservative states will
be given attention. Even if a case is granted review, it is unlikely that the Court
would invalidate such laws because the Court presently provides limited scru-
tiny for abortion regulations using the "undue burden" analysis. In short, the
Rehnquist Court has left the privacy rights of women up to the democratic proc-
ess, specifically state and local legislators.
In terms of right to die cases, the Court has resisted attempts to include
such a right within the concept of privacy. As with abortion, euthanasia was
treated with a minimalist approach whereby the states have been left to develop
their own policies.212 In the area of homosexual rights, the Rehnquist Court sim-
ply refused to address the issue after the Burger Court nearly recognized privacy
for gays in its last term.213 Instead, the Rehnquist Court again has left the battle
over gay rights and privacy to the state legislatures.214
It is apparent that personnel changes on the United States Supreme
Court have shifted policy in the conservative direction and, at the very least,
have placed the right to privacy in jeopardy. With the current composition of the
Court, the possibility of eliminating the right to privacy is unlikely. However,
future appointments most defmitely will be a deciding factor as the distance
between the status quo and the elimination of privacy is only one vote as evi-
denced by the rulings in Webster, Casey, and Stenberg.
granted plenary consideration to a smaller number and percentage of cases than previous Warren
and Burger Courts. Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger consistently heard a higher
percentage of cases on the Court's docket than the Rehnquist Court. Id. at 10-11.
212 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997);
Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
213 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to a case squarely addressing the constitu-
tionality of a Texas law outlawing sodomy, Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (2001), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (Dec. 2, 2002), where the Court is likely to reevaluate its holding in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick. A reversal of Hardwick is possible but would most likely establish a right to
privacy for homosexuals and contradict the Rehnquist Court's tradition of conservatism, judicial
restraint, and states' rights in the area of privacy.
214 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The fact that several states have sodomy
laws is testament to the Court's deference to state legislatures and state courts in the area of homo-
sexual rights and privacy. See generally ERIC MARcus, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS (1992).
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Liberal/Conservative Voting Record of U. S. Supreme Court Justices
in Right to Privacy Cases, 1986-2000 Terms.215
Justice (years on Court) Liberal Conservative
Decisions Decisions
William Brennan (1956-1990) 100% (4) 0% (0)
Byron White (1962-1993) 0% (0) 100% (6)
Thurgood Marshall (1967-1991) 100%(5) 0% (0)
Harry Blackmun (1970-1994) 100% (6) 0% (0)
William Rehnquist (1972-) 0% (0) 100% (11)
John Paul Stevens (1975-) 73% (8) 27% (3)
Sandra Day O'Connor (1981-) 36%(4) 64% (7)
Antonin Scalia (1986-) 0%(0) 100% (11)
Anthony Kennedy (1988-) 9%(1) 91% (10)
David Souter (1990-) 29%(2) 71% (5)
Clarence Thomas (1991-) 0%(0) 100% (6)
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993-) 60%(3) 40% (2)
Stephen Breyer (1994-) 60%(3) 40% (2)
Rehnquist Court Totals 36%(36) 63%(63)
215 The following is a listing of the specific votes of the justices in the privacy cases: Justice
William Brennan voted liberal in Webster, Hodgson, Akron Center, and Cruzan.; Justice Byron
White voted conservative in Webster, Hodgson, Akron Center, Cruzan, Rust, and Casey; Justice
Thurgood Marshall voted liberal in Webster, Hodgson, Akron Center, Rust, and Cruzan; Justice
Harry Blackmun voted liberal in Webster, Hodgson, Akron Center, Rust, Cruzan, and Casey;
Chief Justice William Rehnquist voted conservative in Webster, Hodgson, Akron Center, Rust,
Cruzan, Casey, Lambert, Mazurek, Glucksberg, Vacco, and Stenberg; Justice John Paul Stevens
voted liberal in Webster, Hodgson, Rust, Casey, Lambert, Mazurek, Cruzan, and Stenberg and
voted conservative in Glucksberg, Vacco, and Akron Center; Justice Sandra Day O'Connor voted
liberal in Rust, Casey, Stenberg, and Hodgson and voted conservative in Webster, Akron Center,
Lambert, Mazurek, Cruzan, Glusksburg, and Vacco; Justice Antonin Scalia voted conservative in
Webster, Hodgson, Akron Center, Rust, Cruzan, Casey, Lambert, Mazurek, Washington, Vacco,
and Stenberg; Justice Anthony Kennedy voted conservative in Webster, Hodgson, Akron Center,
Rust, Cruzan, Lambert, Mazurek, Washington, Vacco, and Stenberg and voted liberal in Casey;
Justice David Souter voted liberal in Casey and Stenberg and voted conservative in Rust, Lambert,
Mazurek, Glucksburg, and Vacco; Justice Clarence Thomas voted conservative in Casey, Lambert,
Mazurek, Glucksburg, Vacco, and Stenberg; Justices Ruth Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer both
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216Table 2. Bloc Voting Analysis of Rehnquist Court Justices, All FormallyDecided Right to Privacy Cases, 1986-2000.
RE SC WH TH KE SO OC GI BRY ST BR MA BL
RE --- 100 100 100 91 71 64 40 40 27 0 0 0
SC 100 --- 100 100 91 71 64 40 40 27 0 0 0
WH 100 100 --- 100 83 50 50 n/a n/a 17 0 0 0
TH 100 100 100 --- 83 67 67 40 40 33 n/a n/a 0
KE 91 91 83 83 --- 86 73 40 40 36 0 0 0
SO 71 71 50 67 86 --- 86 60 60 57 n/a 0 33
OC 64 64 50 67 73 86 --- 60 60 64 20 40 50
GI 40 40 n/a 40 40 60 60 --- 100 100 n/a n/a n/a
BRY 40 40 n/a 40 40 60 60 100 --- 100 n/a n/a n/a
ST 27 27 17 33 36 57 64 100 100 --- 75 80 83
BR 0 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 20 n/a n/a 75 --- 100 100
MA O 0 0 n/a 0 0 40 n/a n/a 80 100 --- 100
BL 0 0 0 10 0 33 50 n/a n/a 83 100 100 ---
Table 2a. Conservative Voting Blocs in Privacy Cases, 1986-2000.
Justices Percentage of
Agreed Decisions
Rehnquist, Scalia, White, Thomas 100.00
Rehnquist, Scalia, White, Thomas, Kennedy 94.80
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Souter 86.00
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Souter, O'Connor 75.87
Table 2b. Liberal Voting Blocs in Privacy Cases, 1986-2000.
Justices Percentage of
Agreed Decisions
Ginsburg, Bryer, Stevens 100.00
Bryer, Marshall, Blackmun 89.67
Bryer, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens 79.50
Ginsburg, Bryer, Stevens, Souter, O'Connor 74.70
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Table 3. Liberal/Conservative Outcomes of Right to Privacy Cases for the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 1969-2000.
Burger Court Rehnquist Court Total
(1969-1985) (1986-2000)
Liberal 10 (48%) 1 (10%) 11
Conservative 11(52%) 10 (90%) 21
Total 21 (100%) 11 (100%) 32
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